IN DEFENSE OF COMPLETE PREEMPTION
PAUL E. MCGREAL

†

In response to Gil Seinfeld, The Puzzle of Complete Preemption, 155 U. PA.
L. REV. 537 (2007), and Trevor W. Morrison, Complete Preemption and
the Separation of Powers, 155 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 186 (2007),
http://www.pennumbra.com/issues/articles/155-3/Morrison.pdf.
1

2

Recent pieces by Professors Gil Seinfeld and Trevor Morrison
criticize the Supreme Court’s complete preemption doctrine as mis3
guided and unconstitutional, respectively. Professor Seinfeld suggests
4
reforming the doctrine around field preemption, and Professor Morrison rejects complete preemption as inconsistent with separation of
5
powers. This response defends the Supreme Court’s doctrine as it
currently stands: A state law claim arises under federal law (and so
may be removed to federal court) when a federal statute both pre6
empts the claim and supplies an exclusive federal remedy. This doctrine is a sensible application of the well-pleaded complaint rule that
prevents improper circumvention of federal question jurisdiction.
My disagreement with Professors Seinfeld and Morrison stems
from their characterization of the complete preemption doctrine.
Both argue that the doctrine creates an exception to the well-pleaded
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1
Gil Seinfeld, The Puzzle of Complete Preemption, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 537 (2007).
2
Trevor W. Morrison, Complete Preemption and the Separation of Powers, 155 U. PA. L.
REV. PENNUMBRA 186 (2007), http://www.pennumbra.com/issues/articles/
155-3/Morrison.pdf.
3
The following discussion assumes familiarity with the main arguments in Professors Seinfeld and Morrison’s pieces, as well as the background of the complete preemption doctrine.
4
See Seinfeld, supra note 1, at 574-79 (suggesting that the Supreme Court’s complete preemption jurisprudence could be clarified by linking the availability of federal
defense removal to the “breadth of the preemptive statute relied upon by the defendant”).
5
See Morrison, supra note 2, at 193-94 (contending that Congress, not the courts,
should determine the extent to which federal law preempts state law).
6
See Beneficial Nat’l Bank v. Anderson, 539 U.S. 1, 8 (2003) (describing complete
preemption as a circumstance in which a state claim can be removed to federal court).
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complaint rule that allows courts to consider federal law defenses in
7
deciding federal question jurisdiction. Conversely, defenders of the
doctrine have called it (properly, I believe) a “corollary” to the wellpleaded complaint rule that simply recharacterizes preempted state
8
law claims according to their true federal nature. While the difference between exception and corollary may seem semantic, it goes to
the heart of the Seinfeld and Morrison arguments. For Professor
Seinfeld, the distinction exposes an unexplained gap in the Court’s
logic: Why make an exception to the well-pleaded complaint rule for
the defense of complete preemption but not for other federal law de9
fenses? For Professor Morrison, the judicially created exception violates separation of powers: Congress, not the federal courts, is author10
ized to expand federal court jurisdiction.
This response counters by asking a question that neither Professor
Seinfeld nor Professor Morrison addresses: What does it mean for a
complaint to be “well-pleaded”? I argue that a well-pleaded complaint
is one that a reasonable lawyer would draft under the circumstances.
Professors Seinfeld and Morrison look at only part of this picture—
what a reasonable lawyer would leave out of the complaint, such as anticipated defenses—and ignore the mirror image case, what a reasonable lawyer would include in a complaint, such as an exclusive federal
11
cause of action. Seen from this vantage point, the complete preemption doctrine and the bar on pleading anticipated defenses are simply

7

To see the similarities between the two, compare Morrison, supra note 2, at 19394, and Seinfeld, supra note 1, at 538-39.
8
See, e.g., Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 4,
Beneficial Nat’l Bank v. Anderson, 539 U.S. 1 (2003) (No. 02-306), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/osg/briefs/2002/3mer/1ami/2002-0306.mer.ami.pdf
(“This
Court has also recognized, as a corollary to the well-pleaded complaint rule, that a
plaintiff may not defeat federal jurisdiction by the simple expedient of omitting to
plead necessary federal questions.”).
9
Seinfeld, supra note 1, at 539.
10
Morrison, supra note 2, at 193-94.
11
During oral argument in Beneficial National Bank, a Justice hinted at this reading
of well-pleaded:
The problem with it is your complaint isn’t well-pleaded if the only source of
law is Federal, which you conceded on your brief and again here. There is no
well-pleaded Alabama claim because the Alabama claim or the State law claim
doesn’t exist. The only claim that exists against a national bank for usury is a
Federal claim.
Transcript of Oral Argument at 35, Beneficial Nat’l Bank, 539 U.S. 1 (No. 02-306); see
also id. at 35-36 (“[T]here’s a difference between preemption as a defense to a claim
that is well pleaded and here where you have badly pleaded a complaint that can arise
only under Federal law that simply can’t arise under State law.”).
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two sides of the well-pleaded complaint coin.
Conceived this way, the complete preemption doctrine has two
main advantages. In Part I, I argue that the doctrine creates symmetry
within the well-pleaded complaint rule. The bar on pleading anticipated defenses prevents plaintiffs from improperly forcing cases into
federal court, while the complete preemption doctrine prevents plaintiffs from improperly keeping cases out of federal court. In Part II, I
argue that this approach is consistent with the early application of the
well-pleaded complaint rule. The complete preemption doctrine,
then, is hardly a recent innovation that impermissibly expands federal
question jurisdiction in violation of the separation of powers.
I.

PLEADING FOR ERROR: THE STATE COURT PLAINTIFF’S ARTFUL
DODGE
12

Beneficial National Bank v. Anderson, in which the Court clarified
the complete preemption doctrine, illustrates how a plaintiff can use
artful pleading to stay out of federal court. The plaintiffs were taxpayers who alleged that a tax preparation company had misled them regarding tax refund advances and that a national bank had then
13
charged them excessive interest on those advances. The plaintiffs’
complaint named five state law claims: fraud, suppression of material
facts, breach of fiduciary duty, common law usury, and statutory
14
usury. The defendants removed the case to federal court on the
ground that the two usury claims were completely preempted by the
15
National Bank Act, and the federal district court then denied the
16
plaintiffs’ subsequent motion to remand.
At oral argument before the Supreme Court, plaintiffs’ counsel
conceded that the National Bank Act preempted the plaintiffs’ usury
17
claims.
This is not surprising given that a long line of Supreme
12

539 U.S. 1 (2003).
Id. at 4.
14
Complaint at 7-12, Anderson v. H&R Block, Inc., No. CV-2000-088 (Cir. Ct. Ala.
Sept. 19, 2000).
15
Notice of Removal at 3-5, Anderson v. H&R Block, Inc., 132 F. Supp. 2d 948
(M.D. Ala. 2000) (Civ. Act. No. 00-C-1457-N); see 12 U.S.C. §§ 85, 86 (2000) (mandating the federal rates of interest on loans, discounts, and purchases; and defining usurious interest and penalties for taking such interest).
16
Anderson, 132 F. Supp. 2d at 952, rev’d, 287 F.3d 1038 (11th Cir. 2002), rev’d sub
nom. Beneficial Nat’l Bank v. Anderson, 539 U.S. 1 (2003).
17
The following exchange took place between the Court and plaintiffs’ counsel:
QUESTION: Is it the case that this Federal cause of action is intended by
Congress as the exclusive vehicle excluding your State cause of action under
the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution?
13
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18

Court cases had so held, and that the plaintiffs did not urge overrul19
ing those cases. So the question arises: Why file a complaint that al20
leges claims that any reasonable lawyer would know are preempted?
This is an especially curious question because omitting the usury
21
claims would have made it clear the case was not removable. Given
that pleading the usury claims and then defending them against dismissal would be costly, the plaintiffs’ lawyers must have seen some
value in asserting those claims. While counsel never explained why
they asserted the usury claims, the following inferences are reasonable
under the circumstances.
First, the plaintiffs’ lawyers wanted to be in state court. The plain22
tiffs’ complaint lists only state law claims, and while the parties were
23
24
completely diverse, each plaintiff alleged $74,900 in damages.
Second, as noted above, a reasonable lawyer would know that the
state usury claims were preempted by federal law, and that the only
25
valid usury claim was under the National Bank Act. An unbroken
MR. CLARK: Under Supremacy Clause—
QUESTION: Is the answer to my question yes or no?
MR. CLARK: That is—yes, that is what those cases hold.
Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 11, at 33-34.
18
See Beneficial Nat’l Bank, 539 U.S. at 10-11 (describing the Court’s “longstanding
and consistent construction of the National Bank Act as providing an exclusive federal
cause of action for usury against national banks”).
19
See generally Brief for Respondents, Beneficial Nat’l Bank, 539 U.S. 1 (No. 02-306).
20
Plaintiffs’ counsel was asked a very similar question at oral argument and offered the following evasive response: “Well, and—plaintiffs have different reasons for
pleading the things they do. Under the well-pleaded complaint rule, of course, it’s
their prerogative to rise and fall on the causes of action that they choose to plead.”
Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 11, at 46-47.
21
See id. at 19-21 (acknowledging that the plaintiffs’ non-usury state law claims,
standing alone, would not have been removable).
22
See Complaint, supra note 14, at 7-12 (asserting state law claims for intentional
misrepresentation, suppression of material facts, breach of fiduciary duty, and statutory
and common law usury).
23
Id. at 2-5 (asserting that the defendants were all “foreign corporations,” and the
plaintiffs were all citizens of Alabama).
24
Id. at 6 (“Each Plaintiff individually seeks judgment against Defendants joint
and severally for compensatory damages and punitive damages not to exceed $74,900
per named Plaintiff.”); see 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (2000) (“The district courts shall have
original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum
or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is between . . . citizens of different States . . . .”).
25
12 U.S.C. §§ 85-86 (2000). I leave aside the question of how complete preemption applies when the plaintiff’s pleadings would not state a claim under the exclusive
federal law; however, Justice Antonin Scalia did raise the question during oral argument in Beneficial National Bank. See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 11, at 6-8.
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26

line of Supreme Court cases had reached this conclusion, and plaintiffs’ counsel conceded the point at oral argument.
Third, a violation of the state usury laws would have been easier to
prove than the plaintiffs’ other claims. The usury claims relied on a
straightforward review of objective evidence: Did the loan documents
27
reveal interest charges in excess of the legal rate? The plaintiffs’ remaining claims, however, all required difficult factual or legal determinations. The fraud claims entailed proof of the defendants’ intent,
the materiality of the misrepresentation (if any), and the plaintiffs’ reliance on the misrepresentation. The suppression of material facts
claim required a showing of a “confidential relationship” as well as the
materiality of the misrepresentation. And the breach of fiduciary duty
claims required proof of a fiduciary relationship between the plaintiffs
and defendants.
Fourth, plaintiffs consistently argued that the decision whether to
dismiss the usury claims as preempted must be left to the state trial
28
court judge.
Fifth, the only way for the plaintiffs to benefit from their state
usury claims would be for the state trial court to incorrectly conclude
that those claims were not preempted.
The preceding inferences and observations leave one conclusion:
the plaintiffs alleged state usury claims with the strategic hope that the
state trial court would incorrectly fail to dismiss those claims, either by

To understand the issue, consider a case where state law imposes strict liability, but that
law is preempted by a federal law that requires a showing of intentional wrongdoing.
Assume that the plaintiff fails to allege intent, relying on the strict liability standard of
state law. In that case, the state law claim is preempted, but the plaintiff’s allegations
would not support a federal claim. See id. Because Beneficial National Bank did not present such a case, the Court did not address this question.
While this response does not develop the point, I note that the approach proposed
above would ask whether the reasonably competent lawyer could have pleaded such a
claim. If the plaintiff’s allegations are ambiguous, meaning that there is no indication
whether there was intent, the case should be removable on the ground that it prevents
circumvention of federal jurisdiction. Otherwise, the artful plaintiff could avoid complete preemption by making vague allegations that meet state law but not federal law.
Further, this would give the plaintiff whose claim would not satisfy the federal law standard reason to make that clear in her state court pleading.
26
See Evans v. Nat’l Bank of Savannah, 251 U.S. 108, 114 (1919); Haseltine v. Cent.
Bank of Springfield, 183 U.S. 132, 134 (1901); Barnet v. Nat’l Bank, 98 U.S. 555, 557-58
(1878); Farmers’ & Mechs.’ Nat’l Bank v. Dearing, 91 U.S. 29, 32-34 (1875).
27
See Ala. Code § 8-8-1 (1975) (mandating maximum rates of interest on loans).
28
Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 11, at 38 (“[T]he fact that it may be
ordinary—ordinarily preempted is something that—that the defendants can raise and
the State courts can decide. And the State courts have often—often decided matters of
Federal preemption.”).
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mistake or because of an anti-federal (or local) bias. The circumstances surrounding the state court lawsuit perhaps encouraged that
29
hope. To start, Alabama elects its judges, creating an incentive for
30
judges to favor donors and local voters. The preemption issue in
Beneficial National Bank played into that incentive—the presiding state
judge would know that by interpreting federal law in a certain (incorrect) way, he could provide a benefit to all twenty-six plaintiffs, each of
31
whom resided in the county where the judge stood for election. Taking the defendants’ view, the decision to remove was easy—success of
the plaintiffs’ strongest claim depended on judicial error or bias, and
the apparent incentives were aligned toward that result.
The above analysis highlights a difference in emphasis from Professor Seinfeld’s article. His analysis and proposed reform focus
mainly on the federal interest in uniform interpretation and application of federal law. However, as Professor Morrison notes, the complete preemption doctrine does not track this federal interest very
well, because the importance of uniformity in any single case is unrelated to whether federal law provides an exclusive federal remedy.
Rather, the federal interest in uniformity is related to a host of other
32
factors, many of which are historically contingent.
This response shifts the focus to the plaintiff’s behavior. Complete preemption poses the curious situation of a plaintiff who pleads
a claim that is doomed on the merits. The plaintiff so pleads because
the preempted state law claim is more favorable than the plaintiff’s
remaining claims; his strategy, in essence, is to hope that the state
court will err in deciding the preemption question. When a plaintiff
behaves this way, federal courts necessarily have an interest in hearing
the case—both to avoid the desired legal error and to discourage
other plaintiffs from pursuing the same strategy. And while this inter-

29

See ALA. CONST. art. VI, § 152 (amended 1973) (“All judges shall be elected by
vote of the electors within the territorial jurisdiction of their respective courts.”).
30
See Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 789 (2002) (O’Connor, J.,
concurring) (“Elected judges cannot help being aware that if the public is not satisfied
with the outcome of a particular case, it could hurt their reelection prospects.”).
31
See Complaint, supra note 14, at 2-4. State campaign finance disclosure documents indicate that the judge to whom the Beneficial National Bank case was first assigned reported receiving over $225,000 in campaign contributions the year before the
litigation was filed. See L. Bernard, Smithart, Ala. Fair Campaign Practices Act, Candidate or Elected Official Annual Report (Form 1A) (Jan. 29, 1999), available at
http://arc-sos.state.al.us/CGI/SOSELc12.mbr/output?P01=001599619990131C.
32
See Morrison, supra note 2, at 190-93 (elaborating on other factors that color
federal interests).
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est arguably applies to both complete preemption and ordinary preemption, federal question jurisdiction should be limited to the former
because, as discussed next, only complete preemption is consistent
33
with a proper understanding of the well-pleaded complaint rule.
II. RECONSTRUCTING THE WELL-PLEADED COMPLAINT
Both Professor Seinfeld’s article and Professor Morrison’s response apply the well-pleaded complaint rule without explaining precisely what makes a complaint “well-pleaded.” A well-pleaded complaint ought to be viewed as the complaint that a reasonable lawyer
would have drafted. This standard has three related applications relevant to the current discussion. First, the well-pleaded complaint includes only those allegations required to state a claim under the relevant pleading rules. Because pleading rules do not require the
34
plaintiff to anticipate defenses, such matters are not within a wellpleaded complaint. Second, a reasonable lawyer may decide which
meritorious claims to include in the plaintiff’s complaint. For example, a lawyer may strategically omit meritorious federal claims, and rely
exclusively on state law claims, in order to prevent removal from state
court. And third, the legal characterization of the plaintiff’s allegations should be that which a reasonable lawyer would give to the facts
alleged. Just as a frivolous assertion of a federal claim does not support federal question jurisdiction, so too a federal claim disguised in
state-law clothing does not defeat federal jurisdiction. Because I read
Professors Seinfeld and Morrison to agree with the first two propositions, I focus on the third.
While the well-pleaded complaint rule is most closely associated
35
with the case Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co. v. Mottley, the earlier
case Boston & Montana Consolidated Copper & Silver Mining Co. v. Mon36
tana Ore Purchasing Co. is most instructive for present purposes. In

33

In addition, the Supreme Court has held that implicit in the creation of a federal cause of action is the recognition that federal question jurisdiction is critical to the
vindication of the federal interest underlying the federal statute. See Merrell Dow
Pharm. Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 812 (1986) (“The significance of the necessary
assumption that there is no federal private cause of action thus cannot be overstated.
For the ultimate import of such a conclusion, as we have repeatedly emphasized, is that
it would flout congressional intent to provide a private federal remedy for the violation
of the federal statute.”).
34
See FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a) (requiring mainly “a short and plain statement of the
claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief”).
35
211 U.S. 149 (1908).
36
188 U.S. 632 (1903).
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Montana Ore, the plaintiff sued to enjoin the defendants from mining
ore from the plaintiff’s property without permission. The Court
treated these allegations as asserting a state law claim for conversion.
The plaintiff’s pleading further alleged that the defendants would
likely justify their mining as legal under federal law. The plaintiff relied in part on the anticipated federal defense to support federal ju37
risdiction.
In rejecting federal jurisdiction, Montana Ore linked the wellpleaded complaint rule to competent pleading under the rules of
procedure:
It is quite plain that the various averments contained in the complainant’s bill for the purpose of showing jurisdiction in the Circuit Court are
wholly unnecessary in order to make out complainant’s cause of action
for the conversion of ore . . . . To make out a prima facie case on the part
of complainant, so far as its right to the ore in question is concerned, all
that was necessary was to show the patent and the complainant’s possession under it . . . . It would be wholly unnecessary and improper in order
to prove complainant’s cause of action to go into any matters of defence
which the defendants might possibly set up, and then attempt to reply to
such defence, and thus, if possible, to show that a Federal question might
or probably would arise in the course of the trial of the case. To allege
such defence and then make an answer to it before the defendant has
the opportunity to itself plead or prove its own defence is inconsistent with
38
any known rule of pleading so far as we are aware, and is improper.

Montana Ore, then, linked the well-pleaded complaint rule to the
pleading that the reasonably competent lawyer would file.
Montana Ore also discussed how to analyze the plaintiff’s legal
characterization of his claims. The plaintiff had argued that his allegations were best read as asserting a claim to quiet title—by mining on
the plaintiff’s land, the defendants effectively denied the plaintiff’s
ownership. On this view, the case raised the validity and scope of the
United States land patent under which the plaintiff held title. In rejecting this argument, the Court looked beyond the plaintiff’s characterization of his claim to decide whether the alleged facts truly asserted a quiet title action. The Court found that no such claim existed
39
because the plaintiff had failed to make necessary allegations, and
held that the complaint was best read as stating only a state law claim
37

Id. at 634-35.
Id. at 638-39 (emphasis added).
39
Specifically, the Court found that the plaintiff had failed to allege either that a
court had previously decided title in his favor, or that he was in possession of the property. Id. at 641-42.
38
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for conversion:
[I]t is plain that the suit is not in truth a suit to quiet title. There is a cause
of action alleged that is not founded upon any such theory, to prove
which it is not necessary or proper to go into the defendants’ title or to
anticipate their defence to the cause of action alleged by the complain40
ant.

Since the only valid claim rested on state law, the case could not be
41
brought in federal court.
Montana Ore shows that the plaintiff’s legal characterization of her
allegations does not define the well-pleaded complaint. Rather, the
well-pleaded complaint is read to assert the claims a reasonable lawyer
would conclude are within the allegations. So, in Montana Ore, the
complaint is read to include the valid conversion claim but not the invalid quiet title claim. This prevented the plaintiff from asserting federal question jurisdiction, because a reasonably competent lawyer
would not draft a complaint alleging invalid claims. Similarly, in Beneficial National Bank, the complaint was read to include the valid National Bank Act claim but not the preempted state usury claims. In
both cases, the plaintiffs were precluded from manipulating federal
jurisdiction through artful pleading that served no valid purpose. Indeed, the jurisdictional argument in each case succeeds only if a court
makes an inadvertent or intentional error. The well-pleaded complaint rule should be read to discourage claims whose success depends
on such judicial errors.
One might argue, as did Justice Scalia in Beneficial National Bank,
that the well-pleaded complaint should be read to state no claim
42
rather than an exclusive federal claim. But this approach abandons
the reasonable lawyer view of the well-pleaded complaint. In addition
to assuming competence, we ought to assume the reasonable lawyer
43
behaves ethically, pursuing only legitimate strategies. To read the
plaintiff’s complaint as only stating a preempted state law claim that
must be dismissed imputes an illicit motive to our reasonable lawyer—
pleading a frivolous claim in the strategic hope of judicial error. Instead, we ought to read the complaint as drafted by a reasonable law40

Id. at 640 (emphasis added).
Id. at 642.
42
See Beneficial Nat’l Bank v. Anderson, 539 U.S. 1, 20 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Federal jurisdiction is ordinarily determined . . . on the basis of what claim is
pleaded, rather than on the basis of what claim can prevail.”).
43
See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.1 cmt. 1 (2003) (“The advocate has a
duty to use legal procedure for the fullest benefit of the client’s cause, but also a duty
not to abuse legal procedure.”).
41
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44

yer “who truly seeks recovery” —i.e., a lawyer with a proper motive.
This is done by reading the plaintiff’s own allegations to state the exclusive federal claim, which is precisely what the complete preemption
version of the well-pleaded complaint rule does.
CONCLUSION
The above defense of the complete preemption doctrine is
straightforward. When federal law provides an exclusive remedy, the
only reason to allege a preempted state law claim is the hope that a
state court will err. While the plaintiff is ordinarily the master of her
complaint, the well-pleaded complaint rule should not encourage
such hopes. Because the Court’s current complete preemption doctrine eliminates that perverse incentive, and is consistent with earlier
case law, it ought to be retained.

Preferred Citation: Paul E. McGreal, Response, In Defense of Complete
Preemption, 156 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 147 (2007),
http://www.pennumbra.com/responses/defense_of_preemption.pdf.

44

See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, supra
note 8, at 17-18 (“Absent removal, the state court would have only two legitimate options—to recharacterize the claim in federal-law terms or to dismiss the claim altogether. Any plaintiff who truly seeks recovery on that claim would prefer the first option, which would make the propriety of removal crystal clear.”).

